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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-012

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22 April 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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JAPAN

Atomic Industrial Forum Held in Yokohama

Russian Delegate Speaks

OW0904090392 Tokyo KYODO in English 0824 GMT 9 Apr 92

[Text] Yokohama, April 9 KYODO—All suspect valves at Russian nuclear power plants similar to the one which leaked radioactive gas in March will be replaced, Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy First Deputy Minister Viktor A. Sidorenko said Thursday.

Sidorenko told a press conference at the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum in Yokohama that the leak occurred after sections of a valve regulating the volume of coolant in the graphite-moderated RBMK-type reactor broke off, blocking the flow and causing a rise in coolant temperature. Experts agree the wear on the valve occurred several years ago, indicating a possible planning defect.

There are 16 of the RBMK-type reactors in the former Soviet Union, all similar to the one at the faulty Chernobyl plant where an explosion and fire spread a cloud of radiation over nearby East European countries in April 1986. Fourteen of the 16 are built in the same way as at the Leningradskaya reactor on the Gulf of Finland 80 kilometers from St. Petersburg in northwest Russia where radioactive gas escaped into the atmosphere March 24. The leak raised international concern over the long-term safety of many of the nuclear power stations in former member countries of the Soviet Union.

IAEA Urges Plutonium Controls

OW1004020392 Tokyo KYODO in English 0126 GMT 10 Apr 92

[Text] Tokyo, April 10 KYODO—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) called Friday for the setting up of an organization to control an expected oversupply of plutonium caused by the dismantling of nuclear warheads.

IAEA Deputy Director General William Dircks told the 25th Annual Conference of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum in Yokohama that the amount of plutonium recovered from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from the world's nuclear power plants between 1990 [word indistinct] 2000 will exceed needs by at least 110 tons.

But Dircks said the actual amount could exceed this because estimates for the rest of the century did not include the more than 200 tons of plutonium to come from dismantled nuclear missiles following post-cold war disarmament in the United States and the former Soviet Union.

Dircks said monitoring the dismantling of nuclear weapons and ensuring the safe management and peaceful use of plutonium, which can also be diverted to military uses, is an issue of major international concern.

He called for the setting up of an organization aimed at exchanging information among the international community and the compilation of a plan for the joint storage and disposal of plutonium.

The IAEA estimates the world's capacity to dispose of spent nuclear fuel at processing plants by 2000 at an annual 6,900 tons, and the amount of plutonium recovered at 25 tons.

NORTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry Notes Non-Proliferation Efforts

OW1004213392 Beijing XINHUA in English 1735 GMT 10 Apr 92

[Text] Pyongyang, April 10 (XINHUA)—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) will accept the nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) soon.

Speaking to the Korean Central News Agency KCNA, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said his country will also sincerely implement its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the future too.

He said the Third Session of the Ninth Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK deliberated on the proposal for the ratification of the nuclear safeguards accord, which "is patent proof of the efforts of the DPRK Government."

In this connection, the spokesman said, "We will soon submit an information of the designs of nuclear facilities and a report on the stock of initial nuclear material to the IAEA and make all our efforts to ensure a smooth nuclear inspection."

Atomic Energy Industry's Achievements Noted

SK1104044192 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0424 GMT 11 Apr 92

[Excerpts] Pyongyang April 11 (KCNA)—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has laid a solid foundation of atomic energy industry for peaceful purposes. [passage omitted]

According to the nuclear power development program of the DPRK Government, a comprehensive atomic energy research base was built in Yongbyon in the mid-1960s and the Institute of Atomic Energy, the Institute for Protection From Radioactive Rays, the Institute for the Use of Radioisotope and other institutes have been set up in Pyongyang and other areas. As a result, researches into atomic energy with emphasis on nuclear power have been successfully stepped up.

Scientists and technicians have succeeded in solving scientific and technological problems arising in producing nuclear fuel from uranium mineral and designing, building and operating power reactors suited to the conditions of our country.

Promising uranium deposits have been discovered in various places and uranium mines developed in Pyongsan and other areas through geological prospecting to secure nuclear fuel resources.

A dynamic work was launched at industrial establishments across the country to satisfactorily produce and supply equipment and materials needed for the construction of the atomic power station.

Thus, the nuclear fuel and materials industry based on home resources has been founded in Korea with domestic technology, equipment and efforts and the first pilot atomic power station with a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts was built in early 1986.

Now, this station is operating normally, producing electricity and heat and fully discharging its mission as a physical engineering experimental centre of the reactor.

Builders in the field of the atomic energy industry are stepping up the construction of atomic power stations with respective capacities of 50,000 and 200,000 kilowatts, drawing on their experience in the building of the pilot atomic power station.

When these stations are completed and an atomic power station to be built through exchange with another country is commissioned, the total atomic generating capacity will reach millions of kilowatts around the year 2000.

The atomic energy researchers are deepening researches for the use of radioactive rays and radioisotope in industry, agriculture, public health and other domains.

Cyclotron Built at Atomic Energy Institute

*SK1104054392 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0514 GMT 11 Apr 92*

[Text] Pyongyang April 11 (KCNA)—A nuclear cyclotron has been built at the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

With the nuclear cyclotron commissioned, the institute has become able to conduct a wide range of scientific researches with various nuclear physical experimental means and make bigger contributions to the development of the national economy.

The commissioning ceremony of the nuclear cyclotron was held on April 10.

Present there were Hong Song-nam, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and vice premier of the Administration Council; Hoe Hak-kun, minister of nuclear energy industry, and other officials concerned.

The resident representative of the UNDP in Korea, officials of the trade mission and technicians of the Russian Federation and an expert of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were also present.

Speaking at the commissioning ceremony, Kim Kwang-pin, director of the Institute of Atomic Energy, expressed deep thanks to the IAEA which had offered the nuclear cyclotron in technical aid and to technicians of the Russian Federation who had made sincere efforts for its assembly and control.

He stressed the need to normally operate the nuclear cyclotron and make new achievements in the scientific researches to introduce basic nuclear physics and atomic energy into the national economy by using it.

Henning Karcher, resident representative of the UNDP, said in his speech:

We are ready to fully cooperate with the DPRK Government and the IAEA for a comprehensive use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Yu. P. Vakhrushin, manager of the complex of scientific production of the Institute of Electric Physical Organisation in St. Petersburg, said in his speech that the construction of the cyclotron at the institute was made possible entirely by the talent and industrious efforts of the Korean people. I hope the cooperation between us will expand day by day, he added.

HUNGARY

Police Arrest Uranium Smugglers in Miskolc

AU1304124192 Budapest MTI in English
1402 GMT 10 Apr 92

[Text] Budapest, 10 April (MTI)—Uranium smugglers have been arrested in Miskolc, in the north Hungarian Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county, Police Headquarters announced on Friday. Deputy County Criminal Police Chief Istvan Ignacz said that an unknown caller reported the forthcoming transfer of radioactive material at a pump-station on the road leading from Miskolc to Budapest on the night of 8 April.

At 3 am on Thursday, 9 April, policemen found uranium rods in the boot of the reported red Peugeot 405, and arrested two Hungarian men. Found in the package were lead gloves used in areas concerned with radioactive materials.

According to reliable sources, the 2.6 kilograms of radioactive substance made its way to Hungary from Ukrainian territory. There is every hope for tracing the Ukrainian connection, the police said. While the real value of the confiscated material is merely \$100 per kilograms, smugglers sell it for \$20,000-25,000. The material can only be used in nuclear power plants.

Argentina

Di Tella on Halting Nuclear Material to Iran

PY1004203092 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS

ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1528 GMT 10 Apr 92

[Text] Buenos Aires, 10 Apr (NA)—Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella has stated that the suspension of the shipment of nuclear material to Iran "was necessary for the opening and the possible international insertion of Invap (Applied Research Institute)."

"If we did not make that decision we were going to have problems in a short period of time," and "Argentina had signed contracts for the supply of technology to countries unreliable to the international community, such as the

case of Iran. We were asking for cooperation and we were denied. They closed their doors to us," the foreign minister said.

Di Tella, who made these remarks to a Rio Negro newspaper, added that a letter of intent was signed with General Atomic Company, which is "the largest private company in the world in nuclear matters."

He added that negotiations are being carried out to sign an agreement between the Invap and Westinghouse to clean nuclear plants in the United States, "a task for which the Invap is qualified."

The foreign minister added that "talks are being held with the Chilean and Brazilian Foreign Ministries to jointly ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty, because in November 1991 President Menem signed with President Fernando Collor an agreement of safeguards for the control of nuclear nonproliferation mechanisms."

ISRAEL

Allegations of Missile Sales Refuted

OW1004200692 Beijing XINHUA in English
1908 GMT 10 Apr 92

[Text] Cairo, April 10 (XINHUA) — An Israeli newspaper today indirectly refuted allegations that Israel had sold to third countries its Python 3 missiles with U.S. components.

The "Python 3 missile produced by Rafael (of Israel) is an Israeli development and does not contain any technology or unique components produced in the United States," said the Hebrew daily YEDIOT AHRONOT.

In a report telefaxed to XINHUA by the Israeli Government information office, the daily quoted "knowledgeable sources" as saying that "if there are American parts in the missile, they are peripheral components available freely on the market."

The WALL STREET JOURNAL reported today that the U.S. State Department had told the Israeli Defense Ministry that export license applications for U.S.-made components for the Python 3 had been "returned without action."

The newspaper said that the rejection came after an Israeli company refused to disclose its non-U.S. sources of components for the air-to-air missile, which had reportedly downed 150 Egyptian and Syrian warplanes during various Middle East wars.

There have been allegations that Israel had sold Python 3 missiles with U.S.-made components to China and Thailand without U.S. permission.

Israel, however, has insisted that the export version of the missile are stripped of U.S.-made components.

"We have already said a number of times that Israel's policy is to follow the rules concerning its military production," Israeli Defense Ministry Spokesman Dani Neveh was quoted as saying in other reports from Jerusalem.

Allegations that Israel had transferred technology related to the U.S. Patriot missile to China prompted the U.S. to send a team of experts and officials to visit Patriot sites in the Jewish state.

Upon completion of its mission last month, the team announced that it had found no evidence to the truth of the allegations.

New Committee To Oversee Missile Exports

TA1204135092 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
12 Apr 92 p A4

[Report by Aluf Ben]

[Text] The Defense and the Industry and Trade Ministries have set up a joint committee to coordinate control

over exports of missile equipment and technology. The committee will consider requests to sell items that could be used to manufacture ballistic missiles and, among other things, will check if export requests have been presented to the relevant ministry for approval.

The committee will be part of the supervisory structure Israel undertook to establish when it joined the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime]. The Israeli Government agreed to join the MTCR following heavy U.S. pressure and a freeze on the export of various U.S. components to Israel.

Details of Israeli supervision of missile technologies appear in the "Guidebook for Exporters of Military Equipment and Knowhow," published by the Sales Department of the Defense Ministry. The guidebook contains regulations and instructions for arms exporters in Israel and was prepared hastily in order to include the new restrictions on the export of missile technology and weapons which involve U.S. components, knowhow, or funding.

Israel joined the MTCR in a bilateral agreement signed with the U.S. Administration. The signing was kept secret at first, but on 31 December 1991, official regulations were issued imposing strict control on the export of missiles and equipment which might be used to manufacture them.

The regulations classify missile technology into two groups. The first includes missiles and pilotless aircraft capable of carrying a payload of 500 kg over a range of 300 km or more and the means of production especially designed to develop and build them, such as machines, testing equipment, and software.

The Defense Ministry has informed exporters that in principle it will not grant export licenses for means of production and development of missiles. "The exporter is asked not to present requests in that field because they will be returned to him," the Defense Ministry Sales Department makes clear.

The export of missiles is permitted only to countries which have joined the MTCR: the United States, Italy, Britain, Germany, France, Canada, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

The second group contains items that can be used as components for missiles and launching systems but also have other uses, both military and civilian. The list includes hundreds of items and encompasses many sophisticated military exports: rocket propulsion systems, solid and liquid propellant, complex materials, navigation systems, gyroscopes, radar and laser systems, control systems, and computer systems. All these now require special export licenses.

Control over the export of restricted items was divided between the Defense and the Industry and Trade Ministries. The Defense Ministry is responsible for export licenses for missiles and other items intended for military and defense customers. Sales to civilian customers abroad require the permission of the Industry and Trade Ministry. The joint committee will decide in cases where the responsibility is not clear cut in order to prevent circumvention of the system.

The export of MTCR items obliges the exporter to present an undertaking by the customer abroad and the foreign government that the goods will be used only for the purposes specified and that the customer will ask Israel for permission to carry out any changes or sell the equipment to a third party.

The Defense Ministry distributed forms to arms exporters in which the plant manager or arms dealer declares that he is not dealing with the production or sale of missile technology and makes a commitment to report to the Defense Ministry if he does start to deal with controlled items. The wording of the request for a military export license has been changed and now also includes "an MTCR declaration."

Another clause added to applications for export licenses is a declaration about the purpose to which components and technologies originating in the United States or other countries that imposed supervision on the dissemination of arms in the world would be put. Control over the export of U.S. components has become stricter in the past year due to heavy U.S. pressure.

According to the guidebook, it seems that the Defense Ministry has also become stricter in supervising the export of antiterror warfare knowhow, protection, and commando training. An Israeli who wants to sell knowhow in these fields abroad must present confirmation from some official body in the country of destination—its Defense Ministry, Army, police or security services—that the training will be carried out with its knowledge and agreement, even if it is meant for private bodies. This restriction was apparently imposed in the wake of the Ya'ir Klein affair. Klein trained rancher organizations in Colombia, and it was later claimed that the organizations were a cover for the drug cartel.

The Defense Ministry is also prepared for a possible increase in defense exports to former communist countries. According to the guidebook, it appears that the Defense Ministry Sales Department has set up a new unit dealing with marketing to East Europe.

PAKISTAN

Official Defends Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence

92WP0206A Karachi DAWN in English 22 Feb 92 p 6

[Text] Lahore, 21 February—Former COAS Gen (ret) Mirza Aslam Beg said on Friday that Pakistan's reliance

on "nuclear deterrence" in the absence of security guarantees was justified. However, he says, reliance on nuclear deterrence should be "conditional and defensive, as against free and offensive."

In an interview to DAWN on Friday, he said: "Pakistan is fundamentally committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For this purpose it favours denuclearisation of the region, through international or regional arrangements. However, in the absence of any security guarantees, Pakistan's reliance on nuclear deterrence should be conditional and defensive, as against free and offensive."

He had been asked if Pakistan should have a nuclear deterrent to meet the threat from India.

Asked whether Pakistan should accept the U.S. condition of giving up its nuclear programme to get aid restored, he said: "Pakistan should continue to have good relations with the United States without compromising on principles of sovereignty and independence."

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship, he point out, has "traditionally been amicable" and there seemed to be no "need of antagonism or confrontation or clash of interests." The two countries should broaden their vision to sort out "our national regional and international issues in their true perspective."

About the impact of the stoppage of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, Gen. Beg said it was "considerable," particularly on the Navy and the Air Force. However, the army had been affected only "marginally" as indigenous defence production had increased manifold.

Gen. Beg said the government should give priority to the readjustment of foreign policy options under the changed geopolitical environment; and an early settlement of the Kashmir and Afghanistan problems should be the priorities of the government.

"The notion of appraisal has no meaning when everything is lost," said the frontier COAS when asked to point out Pakistan's "gains" from the Gulf war.

"The Gulf war was fought in a much broader perspective than limited interests of a single nation. The Muslims as a whole, including Pakistan, suffered a lot because of this insane war. Actually, the notion of appraisal has no meaning when everything is lost. We should try to be rational and realistic to avoid recurrence of such tragedies and concentrate on rebuilding ourselves."

Answering a question about Pakistan's role in the solution of the Afghanistan problem, Gen. Beg said Pakistan was in a "good position" to get the Afghanistan issue resolved. As any liberation movement had both military and political aspects, they should be properly balanced, in the absence of which the present problem existed.

"Pakistan," he said, "can provide the political equilibrium. The thrust of her foreign policy therefore should be directed with high vision and adroit diplomacy. It should

play the role of a catalyst by bringing the opposing forces together and reconciling their differences, so that a legitimate government could be established."

After the Gulf war and the break up of the Soviet Union, the conflicting interests of Pakistan, Iran, neighbouring Central Asian States, Russia and the United States, have further complicated the problem. Thus a great deal of diplomatic acumen and sagacity was required in dealing with this problem now, Gen. Beg concluded.

Reports on Nuclear Program Termed 'Baseless'

*BK1504130892 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in English 1100 GMT 15 Apr 92*

[Excerpts] Pakistan has reiterated that UN peace plan in Afghanistan should be implemented and there should be

a total transfer of executive powers and authority to the pretransition council. A spokesman of the Foreign Office told newsmen in Islamabad this afternoon [15 April] that consultations among Afghan parties are continuing on the composition of the pretransition council. [passage omitted]

About Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program, the spokesman said the country would continue to pursue it in order to meet growing energy requirements and derive other benefits from the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. He described the report that the nuclear program has been rolled back as totally baseless. The spokesman referred to the prime minister's statement in Attock yesterday, in which he had categorically ruled out any compromise on Pakistan's national interest. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Signs Decree on Biological Weapons

Destruction Guaranteed

OW1504183692 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1553 GMT 15 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree guaranteeing enforcement of international responsibilities in the area of biological weapons which the Russian Federation claims, in collaboration with the convention on the ban on development and accumulation of stocks of bacteriological and toxic weapons, and on their destruction. Yeltsin put control on enforcement of the convention on the committee on conventional problems of chemical and biological weapons.

Military Expert on Decree

LD1704231392 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1710 GMT 17 Apr 92

[Text] President Yeltsin has issued a decree on establishing a special committee on chemical and biological weapons. The committee is supposed to coordinate preparations for the elimination of chemical weapons. A leading military expert on the problem, chief of the Department of Chemical Arms within the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces, Col. Viktor Kholstov told our reporter [in Russian, fading into English translation]:

The Russian Government is now getting ready to scrap chemical weapons. On instructions from Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar, several Russia's [as heard] ministries and departments, together with officials from the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, have prepared a joint decision on priorities in preparation for scrapping chemical weapons and have worked out a draft decree of Russia's Government. The preparations for scrapping chemical weapons include first of all setting up a special commission to determine in three months where to locate the scrapping facilities. Russia is likely to bear the brunt of the program since all the stores of chemical weapons are located on its territory.

According to the 1990 Soviet-American agreement, Russia must begin scrapping its chemical arms on 31 December this year at the latest and the international convention on banning chemical weapons, currently being prepared, provides for their elimination in 10 years. But this is hardly feasible because of Russia's current social, political and economic difficulties. It would be wise to extend the 10-year term. The term provided for by the Soviet-American agreement also needs to be reconsidered. According to Col. Kholstov, there has been no serious incident with chemical weapons over the past 40 years of their storage in stationary containers. This suggests they can be safely stored for about 20 or 30 years more.

Report Confirms Russian Submarine Sales to Iran

LD1504202992 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1845 GMT 15 Apr 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The latest edition of the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA [New Times] comes out on Friday [17 April]. Its editorial staff have established, that contrary to official information, the fact of the sale to Iran by Russia of three submarines has been confirmed. They are small Kilo-class diesel submarines. Iran paid outright \$6 billion dollars for them. [Video shows cover of NOVOYE VREMYA and inside pages; still photo of a Kilo-class submarine]

The fact is that an agreement is operating that was signed with Iran in 1989. Under this document, further aircraft, tanks, air defense systems, and similar fully up-to-date combat equipment are to be sold to Iran.

The weekly analyzes the problem of trading in Soviet weaponry, which is enthralling the world, but the question of halting this trading with everyone must definitely be resolved positively. The production of arms in Russia and throughout the CIS even now exceeds our requirements and is consuming vast resources. Nevertheless, it is impossible to show good sense, and transform all weapons into utensils, and arms are being sold. What is impermissible is to sell them to all and sundry. The buyers need to be carefully chosen.

In this connection, one possible scheme would be to sell the weapons to major Western countries for decent amounts so that the purchasers could then change them into utensils. In that way one could kill two birds with one stone. [Video shows further footage of a missile emerging from silo; shells being loaded in guns; a radar installation revolving; up-to-date combat aircraft with close-ups of rockets being carried]

Russia Hosts Conference on Nuclear Weapons

Status of 'Nuclear Republics' Eyed

LD1104124592 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 11 Apr 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Rina Mishina] The four nuclear republics of the Commonwealth—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus are today deciding the question of the future of their nuclear weapons. Presently, there are 15,000 nuclear weapons on the territory of Russia, in Ukraine 6,000, in Byelarus 2,000, in Kazakhstan 1,200. Experts believe 80 percent of all of our strategic missile potential is located in Russia.

[Correspondent Sturua] Questions of strategic offensive weapons are being discussed, including the fate of the

Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing strategic armaments signed 1 August last year by Gorbachev and Bush. The treaty has not yet been ratified, but the fate of the countries of the CIS and the whole world depends to a large extent on its implementation.

Taking part in the conference in the Russian Foreign Ministry are the foreign ministers of Russia, Andrey Kozyrev; of Ukraine, Anatoliy Zlenko; of Kazakhstan, Tuleutai Suleymenov; and Byelorussia, Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Senko.

The meeting is being held behind closed doors, but we have learned that the sides are expressing readiness to fulfill the provisions of the treaty.

We will inform you of the results of this meeting in our next bulletin.

[Mishina] Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Baker has stated that the volume of U.S. aid to Ukraine could be reduced if Kiev does not fulfill its obligations to transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction.

[Correspondent M. Osokin] U.S. officials say they are worried by a possible change in Ukrainian policy on nuclear weapons. They are not referring to last month's events when Kiev halted the withdrawal of charges to Russia. Now the Americans are worried about other signals. The Canadian Press agency has reported that the Ukrainian parliament will soon begin discussing military policy and may review its position on the nuclear question. The words of the well-known parliamentary Deputy Khmara are quoted, saying an increasing number of his colleagues are coming around to the idea of preserving Ukraine as a nuclear power.

The republic has on its territory the second largest, after Russia, grouping of nuclear weapons. They include two bases of SS-19 and SS-24 intercontinental missiles and SS-24 in Khmelnytskyi and Pervomaysk. And according to the WALL STREET JOURNAL, Ukrainian representatives confirm their resolve to get rid of missiles due for destruction under the Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing strategic armaments, but they let it be understood that they are not prepared to hand over the remaining missiles, to be precise the 46 SS-24 missiles. Ukrainian officials say they want to keep these missiles for themselves, noting these missiles do not fall under any international agreement.

Russia Urges Treaty Ratification

LD1604091692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0837 GMT 14 Apr 92

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS—Russia has urged Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to resolve all misunderstandings and facilitate a ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

In a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed that "Russia has always called and continues to call for

the earliest possible ratification of the treaty to move further along the path of reducing nuclear arsenals".

The foreign ministers of Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine met in Moscow on April 11 to discuss an agreement on the implementation of the START treaty, which would preserve the bilateral character of the document with Russia acting as the successor to the Soviet Union.

However, Ukraine disagreed with this proposal, saying that all four states should be parties to the treaty. "This approach means a claim to the nuclear status by Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which undermines the regime of nuclear non-proliferation," the statement said.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk instructed his defence minister and the government to ensure administrative and technical control of all strategic forces and non-use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

"Such steps cause concern, especially in view of vigorous attempts by some forces in Ukraine to preserve nuclear weapons on its territory for decades." "Russia cannot close its eyes to these circumstances" and hopes for a constructive dialogue between all sides concerned, the document said.

Byelorussia, Ukraine Commitments Eyed

PM1504095992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Sergey Mushkaterov: "Ukraine and Byelorussia Confirm Commitments To Get Rid of Nuclear Weapons. West Is Concerned About Timetable for Fulfilling These Promises"]

[Text] When will the territories of Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan be free of nuclear weapons? This question, which has been temporarily pushed into the background by the Congress of People's Deputies and the disputes between Ukraine and Russia over the Black Sea Fleet, continues to interest the leaders of foreign states, and not just them. Vyacheslav Kebich, chairman of the Byelorussia Council of Ministers, who is in Rome, and Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov, who has held talks in Washington with Pentagon leader Richard Cheney, tried to answer it at least partially.

Byelorussia will be a nuclear-free, neutral state, Kebich stated to ITAR-TASS. Our stance on this question is principled and immutable. This means that sooner or later all nuclear weapons situated on Byelorussian territory will be destroyed. The only issue is that the republic does not possess its own means to eliminate them. In the minister's words, the only such enterprise is in Russia, and Byelorussia will wait its turn to withdraw its weapons beyond its borders to be destroyed. Kebich also named an approximate time frame for this operation—two-three years. But as early as this year Byelorussia will no longer possess tactical nuclear weapons. Only strategic

weapons will remain on its territory, and how fast these are destroyed will in the final analysis depend on Russia, according to Kebich.

Defense Minister Morozov, it would appear, was untinting in his promises in Washington that Ukraine "will fulfill all its commitments in this sphere." He described the suspension of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine as temporary; discussions are under way right now, in his words, on "how to carry out the further withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons." At the same time he stressed that weapons should not simply be passed from one state to another. In his opinion, an international system should be set up to monitor the dismantling and destruction of these weapons. As for the Black Sea Fleet, it should be free of nuclear weapons, Morozov stressed.

Let us give the high-ranking representatives of Byelarus and Ukraine their due for the clarity of their positions as expressed above. The only pity is that it follows from these positions, especially from the Ukrainian minister's statement, that the process of nuclear disarmament will be dragged out over quite a long period. In view of this, it will not be easy to implement the accords between the CIS "nuclear republics" whereby all tactical nuclear weapons should be transferred to Russia by 1 July this year.

Undoubtedly, possession of nuclear weapons brings a number of benefits to the independent states which emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. Nuclear arsenals apparently raise the status of these countries and give them greater political weight. For example, if Ukraine and Kazakhstan were to take control of the nuclear weapons stationed on their territories, they would at once become the third and fourth most powerful nuclear states in the world. Nuclear weapons could become a trump card which could be used extremely successfully in disputes and conflicts with neighbors.

However, the possible enrollment of the new independent states into the "nuclear club" will endanger all the international efforts aimed at ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The West, desiring to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, will not in these circumstances embark on large-scale economic aid, without which none of the CIS countries will manage to solve their problems.

'Acute Urgency' Underlined

*LD1604131992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1145 GMT 16 Apr 92*

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS—That Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan should join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear states has now "acquired acute urgency". This will remove all misunderstandings and pave the way to agreements on ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive weapons. The Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement released in Moscow on Thursday [16 April].

"The Russian side has proceeded and proceeds from the need to ratify the treaty as soon as possible and move forward along the road of cutting strategic nuclear arsenals".

As is known, foreign ministers from Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine met in Moscow on April 11, 1992, to discuss a four-way agreement on the fulfilment of the START treaty. At present an agreement was reached on documents providing for the preservation of the bilateral nature of the treaty (the U.S. and Russia) and creating a mechanism enabling Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to ensure in full their sovereignty and responsibility for reductions in strategic offensive arms and their participation in verification procedures.

However, the April 11 meeting showed that the Ukrainian side is not prepared to agree with such an attitude, the statement says. The Ukrainian delegation demanded that either all four states—Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine—be parties to the treaty or all of them collectively represent one of the sides.

"Such an approach means nothing more than a claim to nuclear status by Byelarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which undermines the non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons," the statement runs.

These apprehensions are vindicated by the fact that the Ukrainian defense minister was ordered to organise administrative control over all strategic forces deployed in Ukraine. In addition, the resolution of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, dated April 9, 1992, instructs the Cabinet of Ministers to take urgent measures to ensure effective technical control by Ukraine over the non-use of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory.

"Such steps cause anxiety, especially against a backdrop of forces that have stepped up their activity in Ukraine and would like to retain nuclear weapons on its territory 'for many decades'."

"Russia cannot close its eyes to all these circumstances" and counts on the constructive continuation of the dialogue on all these matters between interested sides, the document runs.

U.S. Role in Ukraine N-Arms Transfers to Russia

Morozov Meets With Cheney

*LD1404021992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0050 GMT 14 Apr 92*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Lebedev]

[Text] Washington, 14 April (ITAR-TASS)—Ukraine Defense Minister Col. Gen. Konstantin Morozov, who is on an official visit to Washington, was received yesterday in the Pentagon by U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. As the Pentagon representatives have

reported, this is Cheney's first such meeting with a minister of defense "of any of the former Soviet republics."

Answering journalists' questions after his conversation with Cheney, which lasted more than three hours, the head of the Ukraine military department described the meeting as "very important." As expected, the main focus was on the question of withdrawal of the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from Ukraine territory. In the past few days the U.S. Administration has repeatedly warned the leadership of the republic about the necessity for the rapid withdrawal of weapons of mass destruction from its territory.

"The halt in the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine was temporary and we are now discussing how to carry out further withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons from there," stated Morozov. He has expressed hope that this problem will be solved soon and has assured that Ukraine "will fulfill all its obligations in this area."

The minister did not specify by what date Ukraine intends to complete the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons in its possession to Russia. Morozov stressed that weapons "are not to be simply handed over by one state to the other." In his opinion, it is necessary to create an international system of control over their dismantling and destruction.

Touching upon the question of tactical nuclear weapons on board the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, Morozov said they should be destroyed the same way as other such weapons. "The Black Sea Fleet should be free of nuclear weapons," he affirmed.

Visits With Baker

LD1504195292 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Apr 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met today with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Konstantin Morozov. A broad range of issues was discussed, specifically, policy in the sphere of tactical nuclear arms. Konstantin Morozov confirmed that Ukraine would be a nuclear-free state and that all strategic and tactical nuclear arms stationed on its territory would be destroyed.

U.S. 'Pressure' Assessed

PM1604143592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by Sergey Mushkaterov: "Ukraine Will Shortly Resume Withdrawal of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Minister A. Zlenko Asserts"]

[Excerpts] Everything indicates that Ukraine has decided to relax its tough stance on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from its territory to Russia.

According to a REUTER report, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko said in Kiev that the withdrawal of these arms, suspended last month, will be resumed over the next few days. There has been no mention of a precise date. [passage omitted]

You get the impression that the change in Ukraine's stance did not come without pressure from the United States, which has directly linked the possibility of its granting substantial economic aid to Kiev with the latter's observance of its nuclear disarmament pledges. Typically, Zlenko made his statement while a group of representatives of the U.S. Administration is visiting Kiev.

The West thinks that Ukraine's unyielding position could have seriously complicated the implementation of USSR-U.S. agreements on nuclear arms reduction. REUTER reports that Ukraine has already said that it would like to take part in future strategic nuclear arms talks as an independent state. There is every indication that Washington would prefer to deal with just one representative of the CIS—Russia.

Reports on Ukraine's Transfer Accord With Russia

Yeltsin, Kravchuk Sign Accord

LD1604155892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1545 GMT 16 Apr 92

[Report by ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS—Presidents of Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement outlining the order of transportation of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to the Russian industrial warehouses where they will be dismantled and destroyed. ITAR-TASS was told in the Russian Foreign Ministry that the agreement is accompanied by a protocol and an addendum which regulate the process of control over the destruction. The agreement envisages that the weapons will be taken from the territory of the Ukraine by July 1st 1992.

An earlier decision, reached in Alma-Ata in December 1991 stipulated that nuclear weapons from Ukraine as well as from Byelarus and Kazakhstan be destroyed by July 1st, but Ukraine suspended the implementation of the treaty in February this year.

The new agreement revitalised hopes that the earlier accords will be fulfilled.

Complications Viewed

LD1904130192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1110 GMT 18 Apr 92

[Commentary by Vadim Solovyev—read by announcer]

[Excerpts] This week, the commander in chief of the Commonwealth allied forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, went to France on an official visit. Our commentary is by Vadim Solovyev:

The visit of the Commonwealth representative to France appears to be very important for consolidating and adjusting Russia's relations with West European countries. [passage omitted]

The works [the transfer of CIS nuclear weapons to Russian territory] were fully under way when Ukraine announced they should be halted. It took the sides almost two months to handle the situation. The president of Russia and his Ukrainian counterpart have signed a set of documents on tactical nuclear weapons that stipulate the withdrawal of tactical weapons will be completed in terms agreed upon earlier. The situation around strategic nuclear weapons appears to be more complicated. The Ukrainian authorities lately voiced the wish to bear their share of responsibility for carrying out the Soviet-American treaty on reducing strategic weapons. Such approach not only contradicts the course towards nuclear neutrality recently voiced by Ukraine but also runs counter to the documents signed by the heads of the Commonwealth states several months ago.

It looks like Ukraine tries, in such a way, to raise its international prestige, and the example encourages other nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union—Byelorussia and Kazakhstan—to adhere to wait-and-see policy.

The situation, however, must not be seen as critical. A way out will certainly be found since all the sides believe it is necessary to strictly abide by the international treaties on reducing strategic weapons concluded by the former Soviet Union.

Reports on Signing Denied

LD1704194192 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 17 Apr 92

[Text] An agreement on withdrawing nuclear ammunition from Ukraine to the territory of Russia was sent to Kiev some time ago. Following its signing by President Leonid Kravchuk it was returned to us, said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev today. According to him, President Boris Yeltsin signed this document on 16 April and thus it has come into force.

Today the press center of the Ukrainian president told a CSTK correspondent that it is not aware of the signing of the agreement. Presidential advisor Nikolay Mikhalchenko then announced that today his country re-embarked on withdrawing tactical rockets from Ukrainian territory.

[Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1900 GMT on 17 April, broadcasts the following brief, related item as part of its "Vesti" newscast: "In our evening edition of 'Vesti' we reported that an agreement

on resuming the withdrawal of nuclear missiles from Ukraine was signed. Kiev is denying that report."]

More on Agreement

OW1704012492 Beijing XINHUA in English
2247 GMT 16 Apr 92

[Text] Moscow, April 16 (XINHUA)—Presidents of Russia and Ukraine today signed an agreement on the transfer of nuclear arms from Ukraine to Russia, ITAR-TASS reported.

Under the agreement, the Ukraine-based tactical nuclear weapons will be transported to the industrial bases in central Russia, where the weapons will be either dismantled or destroyed.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said that the agreement was also accompanied by a protocol on the process of control over the destruction.

According to an accord reached in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, in December last year, tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan will be destroyed in Russia by July 1, 1992.

But Ukraine unilaterally suspended the transfer of nuclear arms to Russia in February, demanding an international control over the process of destruction on Russian soil.

The new agreement, which took effect immediately after being signed, revitalized hopes that the Alma-Ata accord would be fulfilled. But it remains unknown when Ukraine will resume the nuclear arms transfer to Russia.

Ukraine Supreme Soviet's Nuclear-Free Resolution

LD1504185392 Kiev UKRINFORM Diplomatic
Information Service in Russian 1325 GMT 15 Apr 92

["Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on Additional Measures for Providing Ukraine's Acquiring of Nuclear-Free Status"—UKRINFORM headline]

[Text] The Ukraine Supreme Soviet, guided by the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine of 16 July 1990 and the Statement of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on the Nuclear-Free Status of Ukraine of 24 October 1991, which announced Ukraine's intention to adhere in the future to non-nuclear principles and Ukraine's right to control the nonuse of nuclear weapons stationed on its territory; confirming Ukraine's intention to join the 1968 treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; bearing in mind that the Government of the Russian Federation and the command of the Strategic Forces have not created the system to implement, by Ukraine as well, effective technical control over the nonuse of nuclear weapons stationed on its territory envisaged by the 21 December 1991 agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons; taking into

account Ukraine's great responsibility for the destruction of nuclear warheads transferred from its territory to the territory of the Russian Federation under reliable international control, which must secure the nonuse of nuclear components of these warheads for the repeated production of weapons and a ban on their export to other states; stressing that the destruction of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine must be carried out under conditions guaranteeing Ukraine's national security; considering it necessary to carry out a comprehensive study of the political, economic, financial, ecological and other consequences of the liquidation of nuclear weapons under conditions of Ukraine's independence, resolves:

1. To confirm the course taken by Ukraine for peaceful cooperation with the world community, nonparticipation in blocs, neutrality and adhering in the future to the three nonnuclear principles.
2. To consider it expedient not to transfer tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine until the mechanism of the international control of their destruction has been worked out and implemented with Ukraine's participation.
3. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is to immediately take corresponding measures for providing effective technical control by Ukraine over the nonuse of nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.
4. To recommend that the Ukraine president enter into negotiations with leaders of the nuclear states of the world regarding the complex resolution of issues connected with liquidation of nuclear weapons, taking into account the necessity of putting into effect as soon as possible the 1991 treaty on reduction of strategic offensive arms.
5. That the commissions of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet for issues of defense and state security, foreign affairs, for issues of planning, budget, finances and prices, for issues of developing the main branches of the economy, for issues of ecology and rational treating of nature, with the involvement of specialists from ministries, departments and the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and, if necessary, independent experts, consider in April of this year the entire complex of issues of nuclear disarmament, in particular the economic, financial, ecological, organizational and other aspects of the destruction of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine, including utilizing their components for peaceful purposes, from the point of view of guaranteeing the security and external political interests of Ukraine.
6. The Government of Ukraine is to submit for ratification by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine the agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons of 21 December 1991 and the agreement between the member-states of the CIS of 30 December 1991 and the agreement between the member-states of the CIS on the status of the Strategic Forces of 14 February 1992.

7. The Ukraine Defense Ministry is to take measures for manning the Strategic Forces, stationed on the territory of Ukraine, with servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

8. The Presidium of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet is charged with control over the implementation of this resolution.

[Signed] The chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, I. Plyushch, in Kiev, 9 April 1992

Byelarus Plans Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Kebich on Nuclear-Free Status

*LD1404093592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0800 GMT 14 Apr 92*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Bukalov]

[Excerpt] Rome April 14 TASS—Visiting Byelarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich told ITAR-TASS Byelarus will be a nuclear-free and neutral state.

He emphasised that Byelarus has the principled and unchanged stance on this issue, it reflects the point of view of the republic's government, parliament and the public.

This means that all nuclear weapons on Byelarusian soil will sooner or later be eliminated. The point is that the republic does not have the necessary facilities to destroy these weapons: the only plant that destroys nuclear warheads is located on Russia's territory. We will wait for our turn to move these weapons beyond our borders for destruction, Kebich said.

He said this operation would take from two to three years. Byelarus will not possess tactical nuclear weapons already this year. Only strategic weapons will be left on its soil and how soon these weapons will be destroyed will ultimately depend on Russia, he stressed. [passage omitted]

U.S. Senator Praises Stand

*LD1704181692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1938 GMT 16 Apr 92*

[Report by BELTA correspondent Tatyana Khryapina for ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Minsk April 16 TASS—"I value the stand taken on nuclear weapons by the Byelarusian Republic," American Senator Alan Cranston told BELTA in an interview. He arrived today on a working visit to Minsk, the capital of Byelarus. "The desire of Byelarus to be a non-nuclear zone is a very strong and reliable stand. Byelarusia's stand on human rights also commands respect in our country," he said. Alan Cranston is on a tour of member countries of the CIS.

Chairman of the Byelorussian Supreme Soviet, Stanislav Shushkevich received the American senator today. Among the subjects discussed were questions concerning problems of disarmament and control of the destruction of nuclear weapons.

"The aim of my current visit is not only to hold discussions on nuclear safety. I want to have first hand information on economic problems so that the USA can provide affective aid to republics to overcome their difficulties," the senator said.

Chaus on Monitoring Destruction

LD1704161192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1525 GMT 17 Apr 92

[Report by BELTA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Minsk, 17 Apr—Acting Byelorussian Defense Minister Petr Chaus thinks that experts from this republic should take part in monitoring [kontrol] the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons being withdrawn from the territory of Byelorussia. The acting minister's press secretary told a BELTA correspondent about the military leader's view. According to the press secretary, Petr Chaus thinks that such monitoring will guarantee that few surprises will occur, including the chance of tactical missiles with Byelorussian markings appearing in one of the world's hotspots.

Byelorussia Position on Chernobyl Causes 'Anxiety'

LD1704124892 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
0949 GMT 17 Apr 92

[From the "External Economic Relations" section]

[Text] Minsk—According to Canadian Professor David Marples, Byelorussia striving to receive Western technologies for nuclear energy development would be a tragic mistake. On April 15 in Minsk a meeting was held of International Congress World after Chernobyl participants and Stanislav Shushkevich, the chairman of Byelorussian Supreme Soviet. [sentence as received] As David Marples, the sociology professor of Canadian Institute of Ukraine at the University of Alberta told PF [POSTFACTUM] on April 16, the Byelorussian parliament chairman did not show a tendency to cooperation with non-governmental organizations on the Chernobyl catastrophe matters, in particular, with such an authoritative fund as Byelorussian charity fund to Chernobyl children. State institutions alone are not capable to solve problems of humanitarian aid and international cooperation, Mr Marples stressed. According to another participant of the meeting, Erika Schuchard, vice president of the UNESCO Commission on Humanitarian and Religious Matters in Germany, the position of Byelorussian parliament chairman on the nuclear energy issues and attitude to non-governmental humanitarian institutions causes surprise and anxiety.

'Loopholes' Seen in Nuclear Export Controls

PM1304112592 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS FAX
DIGEST in English 7 Apr 92

[Article by Vladimir Gubarev and Vladimir Orlov from MN [MOSCOW NEWS] Investigation: "Twists and Turns on the Nuclear Market"]

[Text] At present roughly 100,000 persons are engaged in the production of nuclear weapons on the former USSR's territory. Of this number 10,000 are specialists possessing solely fragmentary knowledge on the production of weapons, and only 3,000 possess knowledge of the problem as a whole.

Works of this kind are carried out on ten sites (for example, Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70) located solely on Russia's territory.

According to Yevgeniy Ignatenko, spokesman for the Ministry of the Nuclear Power Industry, the most likely direction of brain drain from Russia is into the other republics of the CIS. In today's conditions, where financial injections into the production of nuclear weapons have been cut, there is nothing to keep nuclear scientists and engineers born in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other areas, from returning home. In these regions, provided their republican leadership is motivated by political ambitions, they may be used in the military field. It is only if their own military nuclear programme is beyond what the republics can afford that the unemployed scientists will leave the CIS. As estimated by specialists, the nuclear scientists' social condition is sufficiently stable today. It was promised that their salaries would be raised from 5,000 to 7,000 roubles a month. The supply of goods and food to these sites remains favourable and is better than the situation in Moscow. Moreover, ideas such as loyalty to duty and the Motherland still persist in the scientific community. It would be difficult to work here for the A-bomb without definite convictions. And if one adds to this infatuation with their occupation, it becomes clear why articles in the newspapers about nuclear scientists leaving the country, have never been documentarily confirmed. As to those 60 specialists on standard aid programmes in the field of nuclear power engineering in countries such as Libya, Syria and India, they have no relation whatsoever to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Moreover, scientists working alone, even be they talented ones, do not decide anything on their own. Nuclear weapons mean primarily a powerful industry with skilled workers.

Experts from the Ministry of the Nuclear Power Industry maintain that the export of nuclear raw materials beyond the confines of the CIS is impossible even in today's conditions of general dislocation.

Firstly, to conclude each contract for the sale of uranium abroad, a competent body of the recipient country needs to confirm that the commodity will be used solely for peaceful purposes. Secondly, it is checked the physical

protection of cargoes complies with the IAEA's [International Atomic Energy Agency] demands. Thirdly, it is stipulated that reexport is only possible with the seller's written consent.

A licence will not be given to those who may transgress the internationally accepted commitments on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or try to export unpatented technologies. In the next few weeks the government will endorse a list of nuclear components whose export is either forbidden or requires licencing and have it published.

When giving a licence the exporting firm indicates the date of dispatch, its volume, the buyers's name and the sum of the transaction which can be checked from bank accounts. So far no one has turned to Russia's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations requesting licences for the export of uranium except the Tekhsnabexport which will soon hold a monopoly. The government is deciding whether to transfer to Tekhsnabexport the exclusive rights to export uranium.

As far as non-radioactive components of nuclear weapons are concerned, the number of their sellers is larger. For instance, a short while ago the Mendeleyev Institute, having executed a licence, sold 200 kg of surplus heavy water to Germany.

Having worked out a mechanism to control exports of nuclear raw materials Russia cannot, however, guarantee the absolute impenetrability of the CIS' borders. There are at least three loopholes.

Firstly, CIS countries with a nuclear power engineering complex of their own (Kazakhstan and Ukraine) take no part in the work of international organizations exercising nuclear control. Other CIS members where uranium is extracted (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) are not prepared for discussion on effective control. It is across the Commonwealth's countries, where no one checks on Russian licences, that possibility exists to take nuclear components to unstable regions of the world. Also, when taking fuel for nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan and Ukraine Russia formally violates the agreements on control over export of nuclear components.

The second loophole is at customs. The Russian borders lack the necessary equipment and trained personnel for preventing nuclear contraband.

The third is the Criminal Code. It contains no provision for the punishment of those who try to export radioactive substances without a licence or who violate the terms of the contract.

The USSR always held firm positions on the world "nuclear" market. It traded in nuclear fuel with Finland and the CMEA countries. Uranium isotopes were fissioned for customers in the USA, France and the FRG. In 1989 the Tekhsnabexport mounted an offensive on the market of natural and concentrated uranium. Today the Tekhsnabexport accounts for roughly 20 per cent of

the uranium sold on the US market. Approximately 50 per cent of the world reserves of natural uranium (30 per cent) are located on CIS territory, yet the specific share of the sales of domestic uranium on the world market runs to a mere 8 per cent.

Egged on by the government, the Tekhsnabexport has been compelled to sell uranium at low prices. Estimates show the prices are not dumping ones. But rivals seized us by the throat and an antidumping campaign was launched in the USA in November 1991: A court trial has started and if the Technoexport loses, the worst can be expected—an embargo on our export.

The Ruratom has announced its intention to declare a boycott of Russia and impose a ban on the purchase of components for nuclear weapons unless "there is control over leakages". Although not a single proven example of illegally exporting uranium from Russia has been given.

Paradoxically the "nuclear panic" gains the attention of even the Russian government" under the threat of "nuclear epidemic" the West will be more willing to pay for conversion of the defence complex. In the nuclear panic one can guess that the attentiveness of the special services will be great. American special services, since the USSR's disintegration face cuts due to budgetary appropriation. Russian special services, meanwhile are still in disgrace. Both may get a chance to prove their necessity.

Paper Reports Smuggling of Radioactive Material

*LD1004233392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 10 Apr 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Despite Russian security service statements that no radioactive materials are being leaked abroad illegally, KOMMERSANT has leveled new claims that such leaks are taking place. Citing unofficial reports from sources linked to smugglers of radioactive substances, the paper reports that materials are sometimes purchased from officers dismantling rockets. Deliveries from nuclear power stations are also mentioned.

Radioactive substances are usually exported in freight trains containing scrap metal. For example, 56 kilograms of plutonium was taken to the DPRK over the past two months in this way.

Reports Suggest Sales to Third World Countries

*AU1104182992 Vienna ORF Television Network
in German 1730 GMT 11 Apr 92*

[Report by Christian Schueller]

[Text] For decades the surroundings of Moscow were a militarily restricted area. At that time, one could only guess at the reason. Now the military men themselves

seem to be eager to gradually reveal their secrets. Once again one can only guess at the reasons.

In Dolga Prudna, 45 km from Moscow, these mobile ground-to-air missiles of the S-300 type are stationed. [video shows missiles] They are more mobile and precise than the U.S. Patriot missiles, Russian experts insist. Now they intend to sell this modern defense system to Third World states.

A certain African country is willing to pay \$50 million for this facility, General Anatoliy Karnulov says. As if the decision were his to make, he adds: We agree.

The Russian military men know what kind of fear they cause in the West with such statements and assume that it might be worth quite a lot to the United States to prevent a potential sale of the anti-missile missiles to Colonel al-Qadhafi.

This is military deterrence under the sign of the market economy.

Chemical Weapons Storage, Destruction Assessed

*PM1404133192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Apr 92 Single Edition p 7*

[Interview with Major General Igor Yevstafyev, deputy chief of Chemical Troops, by Andrey Abrosimov and Mikhail Gusev, under the "Military Policy" rubric; place and date not given: "Poor Man's Nuclear Bomb Could Make Us Slightly Richer"—first four paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Five years ago we admitted to the world that we have chemical weapons. But even after that, the closely guarded secret facilities still remained out of bounds to the press. But who in Saratov Oblast did know about Shikhany and Gornyy, or in Udmurtia about Kambarka, or in Kaliningrad about the ammunition graveyard at the bottom of the sea? The principle was simple: It does not matter what kind of conjectures citizens indulge in, provided the press keeps quiet.

But times are changing. We are the first people that the military-chemical leadership has allowed to visit secret facilities with a tape recorder and camera.

...The depots are like depots. It is just that the tanks and drums contain millions of potentially agonizing deaths. But the people working here are not suicidal. It is their children who live closest to the dangerous place, while their wives work beyond the checkpoint, behind rows of barbed wire. The roads here are crumbling, the stores are empty, there is not enough housing—these are the "privileges" of the chemical warfare complex. The wages are yesterday's, the prices are today's. Business happily welcomes them—they are educated, efficient, and know how to give and take orders. Many are leaving. Some are joining the ranks of the unemployed.

Truly, measuring the thickness of drums of chemical agents day in and day out and "probing" the air, water, and ground next to depots is not the most entertaining of occupations....

The questions we brought from the military facilities were answered for us by Major General Igor Yevstafyev, deputy chief of Chemical Troops for scientific work, who is a doctor of technical sciences, a professor, and a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Igor Borisovich, if we did not bring chemical weapons into service and, as is being said, did not even intend to do this, why did we obtain and accumulate them and, in short, spend a fair amount of money on them? Incidentally, how much of this commodity have we got? Who, apart from us, possesses them?

[Yevstafyev] It was precisely the presence of chemical weapons in our country that prevented Germany from using them against us. It is the so-called deterrent factor. The 1925 Geneva Convention bans the use of chemical weapons. Yes, it was signed by almost all countries, but with provisos—those possessing such weapons reserve the right to a retaliatory strike.

Russia, the United States, and Iraq possess them indisputably. But, according to informational data, something like 20 countries have or could have chemical weapons. After all, they do not represent anything complex from the production viewpoint. Not for nothing were they previously called the poor man's nuclear bomb.

You ask what quantity of chemical agents is possessed by countries armed with a chemical warfare capability? Iraq has little compared with others, but even UN experts cannot ascertain exactly how much. The Americans have 32,000 tonnes. We have 40,000.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Is that a lot or a little—40,000 tonnes?

[Yevstafyev] Quite sufficient to conduct a large-scale chemical war.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] If so, are we really continuing to produce them today?

[Yevstafyev] The Soviet Union officially announced the ending of their production in 1987, and I say with utmost responsibility: Since that time not a single piece of ammunition has been produced.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Tell me, was this veto on production imposed by us unilaterally?

[Yevstafyev] The Americans also did not produce chemical weapons over a number of years—from 1967 through 1987. But then they resumed. The production of binary weapons, moreover.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What about them, do they have their own "advantages?"

[Yevstafyev] They are safer to handle because they consist of two inert components which become a weapon only at the moment of firing or bomb release.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] And do we not have these "safe" weapons?

[Yevstafyev] We do not have stockpiles, but any country with chemical production capability could have the production potential. Even Iraq has it.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What types of chemical agents is our Army armed with?

[Yevstafyev] Mainly organophosphorous agents; they constitute approximately two-thirds of our stockpiles. They are sarin, zaman [as transliterated], and V-x. They are loaded into missiles, cannon and rocket artillery shells, and aviation bombs, and there are airborne spray instruments. One-third of our stockpiles is made up of lewisite, a chemical agent of prewar times containing arsenic. That was precisely when it was mainly produced. We also have a small quantity of mustard gas and its lewisite compounds.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What do the Americans, with whom we have usually maintained parity, have?

[Yevstafyev] They have a relatively large amount of mustard gas but no lewisite.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Do they envy us?

[Yevstafyev] No, they do not, the substances are on par with each other.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Talks have been going on in Geneva, for almost 20 years now, on the elaboration of a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons as such. Including their development [razrabotka]....

[Yevstafyev] As of today not a single document bans this. Strange as it may seem, even the multilateral convention which does indeed provide for a ban on the development of chemical weapons does not give a definition of the term "development" itself. Let me remind you of 1945, when the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan. Neither the population nor even the Japanese physicists could not understand what had happened. It is terrible when science in a state lags so far behind that it ceases to understand the processes going on in other countries. That is why the multilateral convention contains a section on "Permitted Activity." Under it, a state is entitled to monitor the development of chemical, biological, and other sciences in the world in order to devise protection measures.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] That is, it is entitled to engage in espionage?

[Yevstafyev] You will not achieve anything by spying here. It is much more advantageous to have your own

laboratories and your own scientists who are capable of forecasting and evaluating. Chemical weapons are easily made, and God knows who will have them tomorrow. There is not, and there cannot be a guarantee that all countries would sign a multilateral convention. Even if all chemical weapon stockpiles were destroyed the world will not rid itself of the danger of their reappearing. Including new types of them.

Monitoring the absence of stockpiles of them is quite easy. Monitoring the presence of production of binary weapons is by an order of magnitude harder, although possible in principle. But how can nondevelopment be monitored? There will ultimately be a convention, therefore we too must reorganize ourselves accordingly, which includes activity permitted by the convention.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] The agreement the year before last with the Americans, signed by the two presidents, can be considered the first step toward it. Why, in your view, has it not been ratified yet?

[Yevstafyev] Previously chemical weapons were associated with a number of secrets subject to special protection. As regards nuclear weapons, materials were published and possible doctrines were talked about, but everything regarding chemical weapons was kept well under wraps. The bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreement set the aim of making it easier to find out about each other's potentials. I cannot say that the series of "barter" visits to each other's military facilities yielded much, but it is believed that the sides, by exchanging information on the overall volume of weapons stockpiles, started to understand each other more clearly.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] But did the treaty with the Americans not envisage the destruction of stockpiled chemical agents rather than familiarization with them?

[Yevstafyev] Yes, the sides were due to begin chemical weapons destruction no later than 1992. And by 1995 they were to have a destruction capacity in the order of 1,000 tonnes per year. They agreed to destroy all their stockpiles by 2002, leaving 5,000 tonnes each as a sort of safety margin.

It seems to me that one of the reasons why this agreement was not submitted for ratification in our country is our technical unpreparedness. Political decisions clearly outstripped reality.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] You cannot say that about the Americans...

[Yevstafyev] The bulk of their chemical weapons was produced some 20 years ago. Here they utilized light alloys for the manufacture of ammunition and their weapon casings were thinner, which we, it must be said, envied. But now they have come up against the fact that their stockpiles have lost their operating efficiency and the question of storage became critical. They must be destroyed. We will be in the same situation in about 30 years—because we finished production five years ago,

our weapons are the latest. But the Americans are fine fellows—they very skillfully turned their technical problem into an international political problem. They forced us to spend money on destroying chemical weapons at such an economically hard time.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] And a lot of money which we do not have will be needed?

[Yevstafyev] Under the state program, 5.4 billion rubles [R] plus \$146 million.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Is storage cheaper?

[Yevstafyev] In order to ensure that our stockpiles are maintained in a safe condition we need around R50 million per year. True, at last year's prices.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] So if we wait 30 years this money will have gone to waste—either way money will have to be spent on destruction.

[Yevstafyev] I am not urging that we wait 30 years. But let us get to grips with the technologies by which we will do this. Unlike the United States, we do not even have the legislation which would determine all questions on destruction: How, in what time spans, what benefits will the population derive, what will be gained by the regions where destruction will be carried. Nobody is going to agree voluntarily to having a test site located in his own backyard. It is always a potentially dangerous facility, always a definite risk. Moreover, the country's economy must get on its feet if only in a very small way.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] But was a chemical weapons destruction program not actually devised by the Ministry of Defense two years ago? Surely it clearly outlined all these problems?

[Yevstafyev] It was. It was submitted to the former USSR Supreme Soviet. It envisaged the construction of plants. It also mentioned the costs—around R4 billion. The construction site was chosen without ceremony at the time. Chapayevsk was chosen (assigned). I think it was a mistake. Even without us, there is an uncomfortable ecological situation there, there is simply nothing to breathe. But the plant was constructed. When the situation in the country changed abruptly, a government commission on the spot decided: That's it, we are closing it! The very modern plant did not work for even a day!

The program suffered the same fate. It fell through later, before the end of the year, no decisions were adopted on it. At the end of 1990 Gorbachev issued a resolution in accordance with which the task of amending the program and submitting it to the Cabinet of Ministers was set. We did this by 9 May. Since then no decisions on it have been adopted. Nobody wants to make them.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] You military personnel are being accused of being solidly in favor of absolute destruction instead of processing the lewisite to obtain arsenic, and consequently profit.

[Yevstafyev] That is just an insult. We always struggled against the "favorite" Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry to ensure that raw materials were not destroyed thoughtlessly. Because they believed that it is easier to melt them with sulfur and bury the waste. From the ecological viewpoint this is simply terrible. Every tonne of lewisite yields nine tonnes of waste containing arsenic, which additionally have to be buried somewhere forever. We have said time and again in the press that the technology making it possible to isolate scarce pure arsenic is available. In Gornyy, incidentally, they handed over their test site for experiments. Scientists simply did not see this work through to the end. However, the Americans do not have the advanced technology in this instance, either. But they are very interested in it.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Igor Borisovich, we visited Gornyy and we were taken around the storage facilities which have been there since postwar times, and we saw for ourselves that the 10-mm tank casings are getting thinner by only 0.1 mm per decade, an ideal standard. But all the same, there is no absolute guarantee of safety?

[Yevstafyev] The probability of even a localized accident is 10 to the power of minus four. For comparison: The probability of a Moscow Oblast inhabitant dying from unnatural causes is greater by a whole order of magnitude. Our facility can even improve on this, but not with the current financing.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Life is now such that there would be no harm in insuring such a tank against a machine-gun burst...

[Yevstafyev] Our people do take out insurance. By our estimates, incidentally, the probability of such a situation is 10 to the power of minus eight. If you are interested, the probability of a meteorite falling on our facility is 10 to the power of minus 15. Yes, a 50-tonne capacity tank is not the best method of storage. For two years we have been trying to get money allocated for the construction of a deactivation terminal [terminal rassnaryazheniya]—because our liquids cannot be poured by hand into modern tanks. There is no money. There are plans.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Since you have agreed to be frank, can you name all the chemical weapons storage centers on Russian territory?

[Yevstafyev] We have named them for the Americans, but I cannot name them for you. It is not a question of not being frank but simply of ensuring that probability does not drop to 10 to the power of minus two instead of 10 to the power of minus eight. The world is not without stupid people, and there are plenty of people seeking weapons.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] But there has been information that major chemical weapons depots are located in Azerbaijan, in the combat operations area...

[Yevstafyev] A false alarm. All chemical weapons are located on Russian territory alone. All stockpiles of chemical agents likewise. But there are two provisos. I do not rule it out that somebody may possibly have chemical weapons in the so-called hot spots. And second: Chemical weapons do not include so-called irritants—temporarily disabling agents widely used nowadays for self-defense: gas canisters, revolvers, and pistols.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Were chemical weapons used in Afghanistan?

[Yevstafyev] Ours were not. But others' were.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Who is currently in control of chemical weapons?

[Yevstafyev] The CIS Joint Armed Forces. Recently President Yeltsin signed a decree setting up a special Russian Government committee which was made responsible for all convention questions on chemical weapons.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Have the chemical weapons of the military units which were on duty outside Russia and the USSR been returned to Russia?

[Yevstafyev] They were never issued to troops at all. Chemical troops and chemical weapons are being identified completely erroneously. These troops are engaged

in anything you like except chemical weapons. Only scientific research structures deal with chemical weapons.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Does the chemical warfare complex face a problem similar to the "nuclear" complex problem—the "brain drain," advantageous contracts for scientists from countries desperate to have modern chemical weapons?

[Yevstafyev] They have not been encountered so far. Although in order to make nuclear weapons, evidently hundreds and thousands of people have to leave, but in order to make chemical weapons just a dozen is sufficient.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Igor Borisovich, your forecast: When will our country nevertheless begin chemical weapons destruction and when will we be able to record this fact in writing and visually?

[Yevstafyev] Approximately 10 years from the moment the decision is made and the finances for the construction of destruction facilities are allocated. By our estimates, we will be able to destroy all our organophosphorus in one powerful plant or two regional ones. Plus, a separate plant is needed to process lewisite. Roughly speaking, the figures are 3,000 tonnes of arsenic at \$5,000 per kilogram. A total of \$15 billion. Thus the poor man's nuclear bomb could make us slightly richer.

AUSTRIA

Reports of Nuclear Technology, Arms Smuggling

*AU1604125392 Vienna WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE
in German 16 Apr 92 pp 40-43*

[Report by Robert Geher and Hannes Reichmann: "Rita and the Crossbows"]

[Text] The mission began just as Martin Woess liked it. The order promised the long missing thrill and was supposed to mark the beginning of a lucrative leap in his career: The 35-year-old trading agent from Walding in Upper Austria had a friend drive him to Zurich on Monday, 23 March 1992.

In the trunk of his car Woess had a blue bag. There he kept several samples from his Vienna suppliers—plutonium 239, which could allegedly be used for weapons, and a still unknown amount of material that contained uranium. The exact orders from his clients were: Woess was to go to a hotel in Zurich and hand the bag to three people interested in purchasing the material.

The carefully hatched plan failed. Even though Woess and his friends smoothly smuggled the radiating piece of luggage across the Swiss border, a little later four policemen caught Martin Woess unprepared: they overwhelmed the eight-time former Austrian national judo champion and his driver without any problem. The three potential buyers were able to flee in time and remain incognito.

While the Zurich police released his driver immediately, Woess was put in detention pending trial and was permitted to return to Walding in Upper Austria only last week. There he has to remain on stand-by for the investigating Swiss authorities.

The so far unknown contents of the blue bag, which Woess smuggled to Switzerland, are currently being analyzed. Nevertheless, large-circulation Zurich newspapers report comprehensively about the discovery, with the weight of the material fluctuating between a few grams and half a kilogram.

Even though the authorities refuse to comment on their prey, one thing is relatively certain: At least the confiscated amounts of "plutonium" are those screws that were smuggled to Vienna via Moscow, Varna, and Bratislava months ago. As is known, the analysis of such a screw in the lower Austrian nuclear research center of Seibersdorf showed that it contains only 0.0003 grams of plutonium and comes from Russian smoke gas alarm systems (WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE 9 April 92, "Nuclear Bazaar Vienna").

The tracks of "plutonium" messenger Martin Woess also lead to those dubious merchants in Vienna who have been smelling the deal of their lives since last September. With shock, Woess' ex-wife Petra commented on her

husband's thwarted deal: "Probably he wanted to put everything on one card after his great financial problems to get money quickly."

Martin Woess really needed money urgently. Already in November 1991 he was arrested temporarily in Linz, because he gotten into financial problems through dubious trading deals. "Martin needed an enormous amount of money," Petra Woess reports about his import-export activities. "I did not know anything about his links with some strange plutonium dealers in Vienna," she insists. However, her husband established excellent contacts with the neighboring east.

Many things indicate that Martin Woess, himself, became a victim of the ring of fraud that is operating through a complicated network of international companies. This is suggested above all by a remarkable business address that the Swiss police found on his person: The connection leads to room 415 in the Ananas hotel, Rechte Wienzeile 93-101, in Vienna's fifth district.

Until a few weeks ago, this room was the home of German citizen Rita Draxler, 38. For more than half a year the overweight businesswoman held court in the hotel lobby and received a large number of visitors: According to eyewitnesses, she received arms dealers, drug dealers, "plutonium" smugglers—"businessmen" of the most varying caliber. Upper Austrian trading agent Martin Woess also visited Rita Draxler almost daily.

The German authorities have, meanwhile, started investigations of the austere blond on the suspicion of fraud. Suedwestfunk in Baden-Baden reported on television three weeks ago. The reason for the investigations was the official press organ of the Serbian-dominated Defense Ministry in Belgrade. The newspaper reported on highly sensitive deals conducted by the woman, who comes from Neckartailfingen near Stuttgart—on deals, that certainly do not just involve "cement, sugar, or a few packets of Marlboro," as Draxler's business friend Martin Woess insisted last December.

The newspaper NARODNA ARMIJA, which is published by the Belgrade Defense Ministry, reported details about arms deals that Rita Draxler is said to have arranged from Germany with Slovenia. According to NARODNA ARMIJA, even before the armed conflict between Belgrade's Federal Army and the Slovene militia in March and April last year, there were contacts between the Slovene Government and the German dealer. Following that, the Slovenes were especially interested in anti-aircraft and antitank systems. NARODNA ARMIJA says that the talks ended with the conclusion of a secret contract for the delivery of several dozen antitank weapons of the "Armbrust" [crossbow] type of the German armament concern Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB).

Up to now, Slovene Defense Minister Janez Jansa has denied the deal with as much outrage as did MBB. The Serbian army newspaper, on the other hand, even claims

that it knows exactly how the weapons reached Slovenia: The MBB antitank weapons were smuggled into the young republic in line with instructions given by Rita Draxler and an Austrian called Helmut Weiser.

At least the last part of the report about the MBB connection can probably be attributed to Greater-Serbian war propaganda: The army paper claims that at the same time the Bonn Defense Ministry sent 10 military advisers to Slovenia to instruct the soldiers. The Germans also operated the weapons themselves during the fratricidal war between the Slovene militia and the Yugoslav People's Army last summer.

In fact, Rita Draxler did indeed cultivate contacts with a certain Helmut Weiser during her visit to Vienna. Comprehensive lists of the telephone conversations, which Rita Draxler made from her hotel in Vienna, show that she repeatedly contacted a man with this name. Helmut Weiser is deputy manager of the "Association of Austrian Subcontractor Exporters." He comments as follows on his business with Rita Draxler: "The issue was the delivery of scrap metal, copper and aluminum, for instance, which was sold from Eastern Europe to Germany." Says Weiser about his partner's arms deals: "I also heard about that, but I think that this is just stupid talk.

Possibly, Rita Draxler's professional genesis is a reason why she is again and again linked with arms deals: Before her current activities as a trader of goods of all kinds, she was the manager of the German Museum in Stuttgart and imported historical military products, such as planes and tanks, from the neighboring Eastern European states.

While the Austrian State Police now and again routinely observed Rita Draxler on her visit to Vienna, but were unable to prove any criminal actions on her part, the German authorities have already made more progress. At the moment, the Nuremberg public prosecutor's office is conducting investigations that also involve Rita Draxler. Together with a merchant, whose identity is still kept secret by the Nuremberg public prosecutor, Draxler's deals are also being investigated because of the suspicion that they violated the German arms export law.

Draxler's telephone list from the Ananas Hotel in Vienna—it is available to WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE—gives some insight into the highly sophisticated network of contacts cultivated by the German businesswoman. Within a few hours she conducted a real marathon of conversations, talked with several offices of the Creditanstalt bank in Vienna, various import-export companies, the Polish-Austrian Economic Chamber, and with several people with unlisted telephone numbers; in addition, she had long-distance conversations with people around Stuttgart, Belgrade, Switzerland, Great Britain, Jordan, Romania, and the CSFR.

Draxler herself rejects both the accusation by the Serbian side that she acquired weapons for the Slovenes and the

investigations of the German authorities with a disarming smile: "Of course, I trade weapons. However, I always remain within the framework of the legal possibilities. I have never conducted comparable deals with Slovenia, but I once acquired tanks from Poland for the German Government.

During an arms deal that involved Poland, the paths of Rita Draxler and those of Slav businessman Marijan Sokolovic, 40, who operated from Vienna, crossed last autumn. Together with Draxler, Sokolovic tried to smuggle a 50-tonne delivery of Polish weapons to Croatia. Rita Draxler pocketed a down payment of \$50,000. However, Sokolovic was unable to arrange for the rest of the money. Later on, he completely lost her as a business partner: At the end of November, Sokolovic was put into detention pending trial for several months for trading with harmless "plutonium screws."

In the meantime, Rita Draxler took it upon herself to handle his business interests. Sokolovic's friend, the Burgenland cafe owner and investment consultant Ernst Neumayer, drove Draxler from appointment to appointment in his black Porsche 911 Targa. On Sokolovic's behalf, she offered interested persons "plutonium" that could allegedly be "used for weapons" and "Red Mercury"—a mercury compound, which, according to those who offer to sell it, allegedly accelerates nuclear reactions, a claim that experts call "pure fraud."

Marijan Sokolovic was in prison until the beginning of February. During this time he fell out with Rita Draxler. The arms deal with Poland ran aground and Draxler left for Germany. During a brief visit to Vienna three weeks ago, Draxler said of her current relationship with Sokolovic: "Everybody in Serbia and Croatia knows that Sokolovic is not his real name." She calmly counters the accusation that she trades false plutonium, Red Mercury, and weapons: "Oh boy, you can get this everywhere."

The man who discreetly pulls the strings in the background cultivates contacts with both Rita Draxler and Marijan Sokolovic. Sokolovic worked as a manager for him; Draxler, for her part, was clearly told by him that no one arranges deals from Vienna without his agreement. This man is called Aleksander Viktorionovich Kutsin and rules over a worldwide empire of companies, comprising a total of 49 enterprises. Even though the Austrian State Police have repeatedly linked Kutsin, as a key figure, with the trade of weapons and nuclear technology, searches of his offices have been unsuccessful so far.

About a month ago Vienna became too hot for the 36-year-old Russian. He moved out of his headquarters in the prestigious Haas House in St. Stephen's Square (monthly rent: 150,000 schillings) and flew to business friends in the Iranian capital of Tehran. At the moment Kutsin—his wife and children continue to live in Vienna—is commuting between Munich and Warsaw. In the Polish capital he refreshes contacts with his business

partner, Wojciech Grabowski. Grabowski is an arms dealer, who is known in these circles and against whom the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (BKA) in Wiesbaden has been investigating—unsuccessfully—for two years. The BKA collection of circumstantial evidence comprises trade with tanks, helicopters, and weapons of all kinds. Grabowski's explosive Kutsin connection: The Pole has authorization for \$5 million. Within this framework he is permitted to conclude deals for Aleksander Kutsin.

Finally, for months the Austrian State Police, too, have been investigating Kutsin and one of his mediators: against Croatian-born Anton Kikas, who has a Canadian passport. On 1 September 1991 the 55-year-old merchant took a Boeing 707 of Uganda Airlines from Johannesburg in the direction of Croatia. Near Zagreb the plane was intercepted by two fighter bombers of the Yugoslav People's Army and was forced to land. The soldiers impounded the cargo—a total of 18 tonnes, including AK 47-M and AK 47 machine guns, ammunition, panzerfausts, and mines—and arrested Anton Kikas.

Kikas, who emigrated from Croatia to Toronto in 1968, was the president of the Association of Croatian Businessmen in Toronto and a member of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). In this function, he collected more than \$900,000 from Croatian emigrants for purchasing weapons, which he deposited in a bank in Klagenfurt.

Then he established contacts in Vienna and Frankfurt with people who gave him access to the desired weapons—a total of 3,000 guns and 1.5 million rounds of ammunition. During interrogations by the Serbian intelligence service, Kikas said that his most important contact was Aleksander Viktorionovich Kutsin.

FRANCE

Mitterrand Stance on Nuclear Deterrence

PM1604064092 Paris LE MONDE in French
14 Apr 92 p 15

[Report by Jacques Amalric: "Deterring Whom?"]

[Text] "France's defense is still based essentially on its nuclear force.... That is the weapon which prevents wars." "There is now just one military force (I will not say a bloc but a military force), and that is the one of which we are a member, in other words the Atlantic Alliance."

These two statements made several moments apart on Sunday evening by the president of the republic are surely ultimately inconsistent. Is it not rather obstinate

to continue to regard as "essential" and the "cornerstone" of the French defense system—to cite the expression used by Pierre Berégovoy to the National Assembly—a deterrent force which no longer has any potential enemy to deter?

Mr. Mitterrand is well aware of that. That is why, without fear of contradicting himself, at the end of his explanations on the suspension of nuclear tests, he referred to the need for France to "diversify its priorities" in the defense sphere. Was that not an admission that there ought henceforth to be several "priorities" and that the nuclear deterrent, which helped maintain peace in Europe during the 40 years of the cold war, can no longer be the alpha and omega of French security in the future?

In that case, why not proclaim this clearly? Why not launch the debate which will sooner or later have to be held on the place of the nuclear deterrent in France's defense doctrine? First because the control of the deterrent force is an essential attribute of the president of the republic, a point which Mr. Mitterrand emphasized again on Sunday evening. Admitting that the deterrent is now no longer "operating" as before is an admission of the erosion of a mythical power.

The second reason for the president's reservations lies in the hybrid nature of the French deterrent, which is both a diplomatic and a military weapon. Questioning its role would amount to questioning France's famous "rank" in the world, which is now based on an obsolete order. Mr. Mitterrand clearly does not think this is the right time to do so when a large number of French people are already troubled by the additional "abandonment of sovereignty" involved in the Maastricht treaty. Indeed, how can he explain to them that the "nuclear resource" is being exhausted as are the moral and international privileges (such as the permanent membership in the Security Council) which we owe to the obstinacy of General de Gaulle and his diplomats who struggled in 1945 to win for France the status of victor in World War II?

Mr. Mitterrand therefore prefers discreet maneuvering to the real but difficult debate: The defense funding devoted to nuclear weapons is reduced, questions are asked in the inner circle but to satisfy the people they say that things have not changed and that France is still one of the "most powerful countries in the world." At the same time, through the suspension of the nuclear tests, the president of the republic is trying to turn a weakness into an advantage: Maintaining, through disarmament, the "club" of nations which stand above the others because of nuclear weapons. But this is a very risky exercise, which is not really compatible with the establishment of a European defense unless the future of the French deterrent is openly tackled.

He is already encountering open hostility from the United States which last fall opposed the plan for a

conference of nuclear powers put forward by Mr. Mitterrand to supervise the denuclearization of the republics of the former USSR, aside from Russia. And, since then, the U.S. Administration has made it known that it would continue nuclear tests and has made no secret of its intention to handle the Soviet nuclear issue alone—an issue which is proving more difficult than expected: Russia has suspended its tests but, contrary to its promises, is finding it very difficult to "bring back" the tactical and strategic weapons deployed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus; and it is having even greater technical problems in dismantling them.

Proposing negotiations in these conditions is probably asking for an outright American rejection. Washington hopes to solve the failure of the former USSR by unilateral reductions and pressures of all kinds. Ultimately, it regards France's nuclear obstinacy as doomed. Surely the best response would be for Paris to calmly and unilaterally reassess the risks, threats, and needs, which would certainly not mean the end of deterrence but would make it possible to take account of the end of its omnipotence.

Russia 'Interested' in Civil Nuclear Technology

AU1704141092 Paris AFP in English 1323 GMT
17 Apr 92

[Text] Paris, April 17 (AFP)—The head of the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) told French officials here Friday that Russia is "interested" in French civil nuclear technology.

Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov expressed Russia's interest at a meeting he requested with Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, according to French Foreign Ministry spokesman Maurice Gourdault-Montagne.

Shaposhnikov arrived here on Monday at the invitation of Defense Minister Pierre Joxe. He also met Friday with Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy.

In his talks with Dumas, the marshal expressed appreciation for France's efforts to create "a climate of confidence in security matters," and discussed problems concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons from CIS republics to Russia, the spokesman said.

Moscow announced Thursday that Russia and Ukraine had signed an accord on the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to bases in Russia, ending a dispute that arose on March 12 when Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk suspended the transfers to demand guarantees on their destruction once in Russia.

Dumas meanwhile stressed France's commitment to a June 3, 1991 plan for disarming and controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, and to a moratorium on nuclear tests in 1992.

Dumas said that France would stick to this policy as long as disarmament agreements continued to be observed, the spokesman said.

GERMANY

Chemical Arms Export Deals to Iraq Reported

AU1304134792 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL
in German 13 Apr 92 pp 79-87

[Unattributed report: "Bugs, Fleas, Persians, Israelis"]

[Text] It was deathly silent on the premises of the Iraqi state company Muthanna [spelling as published] State Establishment. No movement, no smoke, no machinery noise. UN inspectors noted down "scenes of incredible destruction."

The landscape of ruins, 40 km from Samarra, is a symbol of the fantasies of omnipotence of Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn. Like carnassials, the remnants of bombed factories of death are rising out of the desert sand—ample facilities with sophisticated technology.

Until shortly after the outbreak of the Kuwait crisis in October 1990 mustard gas was produced there in large facilities with a capacity of up to 1,700 tonnes per year—enough to contaminate entire tracts of land. In a neighboring facility the workers had to work around the clock to produce the nerve gases sarin and tabun.

When in the spring of 1988 the mixer of one of the cauldrons did not work, operations stopped only briefly. Quickly the production of sarin was shifted to another building—the daily target of 2.5 tonnes had to be met, no matter how.

The state combine near Samarra was the invention of an evil mind. UN inspectors, sent by the Security Council to destroy the Iraqi means of mass destruction and their production facilities, discovered death in all varieties and calibers in an area of 10 to 15 km.

On the Muthanna premises almost the entire arsenal of conventional ammunition, from the ammunition of grenade launchers, 122-mm shells, to 500-kg drop bombs [Fallbomben], was filled with poison gas. As of 1990, the warheads for Scud missiles, which Iraq fired at Israel during the Gulf war, were re-equipped for chemical warfare at this enormous facility.

In this evil factory engineers mixed the preliminary products for the chemical destruction of people. Scientists pondered over recipes for the combat agent soman, which is absolutely lethal in tiny dosages. The poison, which was developed in 1944, is a German invention, like the older mustard gas or the gases tabun and sarin.

It will probably take years before the UN inspectors have destroyed all the poison gas supplies in Iraq. However, the history of the development of this unique combat agent facility is to be clarified in Germany within two years.

On the Monday after the Easter holidays [27 April], the trial of 10 German managers will begin at the 13th division for criminal matters at the Darmstadt Regional

Court. These managers are said to have participated in the construction of the Iraqi poison gas factory.

In addition to businessmen for the companies Karl Kolb and Pilot Plant from Dreieich in Hesse as well as the Hamburg Water Engineering Trading (W.E.T.), which are all known in this field, minor businessmen from subcontractor industries also have to appear in court. They are accused of violating the foreign trade law; the maximum penalty—three years in prison.

Investigations began five years ago when numerous companies were searched. Before the beginning of the trial, which is scheduled for 70 to 100 days, there is disagreement in the defendants' camp. Some are willing to give partial admissions at best, but others want to tell everything they know.

Entrepreneur Juergen Stockmeier, head of a subcontracting company in Laatzen, Lower Saxony, admits that a disgusting business was pursued. One of his companies delivered more than 30 tonnes of phosphorous oxychloride (POCl₃), which reached Iraq on a roundabout route. POCl₃ is the starting ingredient for tabun and sarin.

He could "slap" himself, because he did not pay attention for "20 seconds" when an order by Hamburg W.E.T. was examined, Stockmeier said. "I am surrounded by a group of co-defendants who make me want to throw up." Nevertheless, he wants to accept the "responsibility for the carelessness of my employees in conducting this deal."

Other managers do not have this courage to admit their mistake, that is, if it is meant seriously. The FRG Government, too, which is involved in the poison gas deals because it knew about them, has played an embarrassing role.

At first Bonn simply denied the existence of German poison gas facilities in Iraq. Even though there existed unambiguous information from the Israeli and U.S. intelligence services as early as at the beginning of 1984, exports of production parts continued secretly until 1989. No politician in the responsible Economics Ministry and Foreign Ministry has so far been willing to accept responsibility.

When Bonn prohibited partial deliveries in the mid-1980's, Kolb businessmen boldly demanded compensation from the state. At that time, the FRG Government even negotiated seriously with the managers about their demands for compensation.

Documents that have so far been locked away show that in the mid-1980's the FRG Government was willing to pay the suppliers compensation totalling DM6 million, if they let the deal slip. This cabinet decision will also be discussed at the Darmstadt trial.

Cooperation went even further: In 1986 the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) hired W.E.T. manager Peter

Leifer. For almost two years Leifer cooperated with the intelligence service and provided information about Iraq.

Up to now the FRG Government has been stalling in the poison gas affair: The confidential UN reports about German participation in the Iraqi factories of death have not been passed on by Bonn to the Darmstadt court.

The Foreign Ministry of Liberal Hans-Dietrich Genscher told the chairman, Judge Alfred Pani, that none of the German UN inspectors may appear as a witness. The official reason: The United Nations strictly refuses to lift the inspectors' duty to silence.

The version from the New York UN headquarters sounds less harsh, however. Tim Trevan of the special commission for Iraq affirms that permission to give testimony indeed cannot be granted, but the United Nations is certainly willing to provide certain documents.

This may be important, because the papers, which are already circulating among the counsels for the defense and the public prosecutors, largely confirm the results of the piece-by-piece work of the German investigators.

So far the companies, such as Kolb from Dreieich, have always insisted that the exported factories are harmless facilities for the production of plant protection substances. The UN inspectors did not see one single pesticide factory on the gigantic Muthanna premises, however.

The most important German facilities, which were probably involved in the production of mustard gas, tabun, and sarin, were delivered between February 1983 and March 1985. According to the Iraqis, the production of poison gas started in 1986.

According to the UN inspectors, German exports secretly continued after the end of the Iraqi-Iranian war in 1988. This supports the results of German investigators. Baghdad has now admitted that the poisonous substances were produced until October 1990.

In addition, the findings of German investigators about the locations of the combat agent factories largely fit in with the findings of the UN inspectors.

In view of the facts from Muthanna, statements from last year sound like a bad satire. Heinrich Weiss, president of the Federal Association of German Industry, stated after the Gulf war: "German companies did not deliver any poison gas weapons."

Technical magazines, such as WEHRTECHNIK from Bonn, assisted him. Perhaps there is "no poison gas from Iraqi production" at all. The colorful economic magazine FORBES of Burda publishing company knew everything, putting it into a headline: "The Poison Gas Lie."

All attempts to ignore the disgusting business with death were useless, however. Pointing out that, after all,

French, Spaniards, Italians, Russians, and Romanians also earned money by being involved in the production of poison gas, did not bring exoneration: About 80 percent of the facilities in Muthanna come from Germany, according to new findings by the FRG Government.

This was not a secret. "Everyone knew what was going on," Fritz-Willi Doerflein summarizes. The engineer from Rodgau in Hesse was on site in Iraq in 1983. "What are you doing here?" he asked a worker. According to Doerflein, the man answered: "We produce substances against vermin—against bugs, fleas, locusts, Persians, Israelis." Doerflein wants to testify to this in court.

Did everybody also know what was happening on "Sauerkraut Boulevard"? This is what the UN inspectors flippantly call one of the main streets on the Muthanna premises. In contrast to East 86th Street in New York, where there is the other "Sauerkraut Boulevard," in Muthanna one cannot buy cuckoo clocks from the Black Forest or nut crackers from the Erzgebirge Mountain Range. What was in demand was top German technology.

It is contained in test facilities, which survived the Allies' bombs surrounded by 13 dummy factories. "The design of the factory," according to the UN inspectors, is "modern and made of top quality materials, with a very high standard of engineering." Even though the Iraqis call the factory just a test facility, it is a "remarkable facility."

UN Chief Inspector Peter Dunn assumes that this is one of Saddam Husayn's special devilries: This factory might have been used for producing nerve gas VX, which is lethal in even smaller dosages than tabun or sarin. According to the UN protocol, Dunn bases his assumptions on, among other things, "the layout" of the facility.

Business papers do not yield any information anymore; the UN inspectors found only "heaps of ash" everywhere. Large amounts of documents had obviously been quickly burnt before the inspectors' visit. Asked what had happened, the responsible Iraqis said that they had had a power outage—therefore, they had lit a fire.

UN photographer Pernacca Sudhakaran took photos of the type plates in the test facilities. It was possible to identify 19 suppliers—17 came from Germany. "Most parts of the equipment," the United Nations says, "were delivered by Pilot Plant." Companies such as Ludwig Hammer GmbH from Kleinostheim in Bavaria also are listed.

The company provided ventilation and electrical equipment for several buildings at the Muthanna complex. In Iraq, Hammer was mainly a subcontractor for Heberger Bau from Schifferstadt. The Iraq business did not hurt the large company from the Palatinate, which built a total of eight buildings in Muthanna. Last year, Heberger received the image-enhancing order of building a fence around Chancellor Helmut Kohl's villa in Oggersheim.

Some distance away from the test facilities a building that the inspectors call the "inhalation chamber" also survived the war. The facility made of "stainless steel" is known to German experts.

Rhema Labortechnik GmbH from Hofheim in the Taunus region sold an "inhalation system for toxicological checks" to Samarra. Beagle dogs were supplied for the first gas tests. Later, the chemists sent donkeys to the gas chamber made of steel. Then it was allegedly even tested on Iranian prisoners of war to see the effects of nerve gas. According to the United Nations, this "facility" could be used to examine the "lethal effect of substances."

German investigators have long known that these test facilities and the steel chamber were delivered to Iraq from Germany. Nevertheless, the exports did not figure in the Darmstadt indictment. According to the prosecutors, it could not be proved that the facilities were especially built for the evil purpose.

On-site inspection in the desert was not able to clarify all German traces. The filling station, for instance, which was reportedly equipped by businessmen from the Hamburg W.E.T., was bombed. The factory for bomb casings, which was reportedly furnished by the Westphalian company Schwender, was destroyed. Most facilities delivered by Kolb and Pilot Plant, which reportedly served the production of combat agents, are real deposits of hazardous waste.

Near Fallujah, about 40 km from the Muthanna premises, UN inspectors discovered facilities used at the least for the production of preliminary products. Such a factory, worth about DM20 million, was delivered to Fallujah by W.E.T. under project No. 33/85. In building No. 162 the UN inspectors found 35 containers with 875 kg of CS [expansion unknown] tear gas. It had been delivered from Hamburg to Kuwait and then reached Iraq.

The UN inspectors are accompanied by watchful Iraqis at every step. Dr. Imad Husayn al-'Ani, for instance, is considered a man well informed for talks and knowledgeable for discussions. In the past this "high-ranking official in the Muthanna organization" (United Nations) acted as a buyer. At the beginning of the 1980's, he assembled the factories of death in the FRG.

Not a Dr. No, only a friendly travelling merchant, who, together with other high-ranking officials, was permitted to live in a refuge with a basketball court, a swimming pool, a billiard hall, and a gymnastics room—all at a safe distance 16 km south of the poison gas factories.

Arms Exports to Iran Reportedly Facilitated

Export Permits Granted

LD1604151292 Berlin ADN in German 0918 GMT
16 Apr 92

[Text] Hamburg (ADN)—Deals worth millions were made with Iranian arms dealers in the eighties, apparently with the knowledge and sometimes the support of the Foreign Ministry. This is reported by DER SPIEGEL magazine in its edition to be published on Saturday. According to the magazine, state prosecutors investigating Fritz Werner, the manager of the Hesse Arms Company, have found documents from the Foreign Ministry containing hints for exports during the Gulf War between Iran and Iraq.

In a letter to Hanns Arnt Vogels, then head of the board of directors of the Fritz Werner GmbH, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher himself had pointed out that permits for exports to Iran could be granted during the war if the supplies concerned were spare parts to be delivered under previously existing contracts, the magazine reports. Using this trick, export permits for ammunition factories worth more than 120 million German marks had been obtained. The Foreign Ministry had obviously supported a Dusseldorf-based arms purchasing firm of the Iranian War Ministry. Large shipments of arms to Tehran were arranged through these companies.

According to DER SPIEGEL, the Foreign Ministry also protected the former Iranian special envoy Sadeq Tabataba'i against police persecution for illegal arms deals. At the beginning of the eighties the Iranian was to have been arrested by the CID [criminal investigations department] for the attempted purchase of 50 tanks. Genscher's ministry prevented the arrest on the grounds of the man's alleged diplomatic status. After new files were found in the GDR, it turned out that Tabataba'i had been actively purchasing arms in East Berlin too. According to this information, the GDR supplied large arms consignments to Iran.

The article was prereleased in an edited version.

Foreign Ministry Rejects Charge

LD1604152192 Hamburg DPA in German 1310 GMT
16 Apr 92

[Text] Bonn—A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn "categorically" rejects the DER SPIEGEL accusation that the ministry had supported arms deals or had given hints for them. Genscher's 10 May 1981 letter to Vogel proved that authorizations for such exports "are carefully investigated and checked, then as now." These authorizations would not be granted through the Foreign Ministry but by the Federal Office for Trade and Industry in Eschborn.

SPD [Social Democratic Party] foreign policy expert Guenter Verheugen described the accusations as serious.

They had to be cleared up quickly and completely. "If they are correct then this will definitely have consequences", the deputy said.

Paper Reports on Arms Exchanges With Libya

AU1604134792 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Apr 92 p 16

["K.B." report: "Deals With Libya Even Without Hermes"]

[Excerpt] Bonn, 15 April—German exports to Libya have remained almost unchanged for many years, totaling about 1 billion German marks [DM] a year. Despite unstable political relations between Libya and the Western world, additional attractive deals have been concluded from the point of view of the export economy. Approximately 60 German companies have branch offices in Libya. The DM1 billion in exports was achieved even without the Hermes export guarantees. Export guarantees for the Libyan market were stopped in 1986. Some German enterprises have damaged their international reputation as a result of their business relations with Libya, because they were involved in the planning and the construction of the chemical weapons plant at al-Rabitah, in which civilian technology was misused for military purposes. Germany is not involved in direct arms exports to Libya. Civilian goods are not subject to the embargo imposed by the Security Council resolution, which the Federal Government has now fulfilled by issuing a decree. [passage omitted]

SPAIN

Breakup of Missile-Trafficking Network Detailed

92ES0671A Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish
16 Mar 92 p 8

[Article by J. Diaz Herrera and I. Duran: "Arms-Trafficking Network Arrested in Madrid Was Trying To Buy U.S. Stinger Missiles"]

[Text] The U.S.-made Stinger hand-held missile was the immediate objective of the arms-trafficking band that was arrested by the police last week in Madrid. This missile, which proved its great effectiveness in the second half of the Gulf war, is standard issue to U.S. Infantry troops. The head of the network, Mehdi Hashani, is regarded by police as the Iranians' main arms trafficker for Europe and the United States and was implicated in the "Irangate" scandal.

The arms-trafficking network that was dismantled last week by the Police Interior Brigade in Madrid had been trying for several months to buy a shipment of Stingers, a hand-held missile made in the United States.

This missile, which weighs a mere 16 kilograms and has an effective range of several kilometers, is standard issue

to U.S. Infantry troops. In the second half of the Gulf war, it proved to be highly effective against tanks and low-flying aircraft.

The purchase of this minimissile, considered the lightest and most lethal weapon in the West's armory, has become the top priority of the Iranian Armed Forces in the last year.

The organization of strategic arms smugglers was also interested in obtaining another missile, the Crotale; sophisticated microchips for the radar installations of the military bases surrounding Tehran; and the Klystron missile-guiding systems for Iran's Phantom F-4 jets. They were arrested just when they were attempting to obtain two Klystron amplifiers, which are regarded as military materiel of restricted use in Europe, the United States, and Canada.

Mehdi Kashani, the brains of the arms-trafficking band, was one of six persons arrested in Madrid for violating the accords of the Multilateral Coordinating Committee for Strategic Exports (COCOM), of which Spain is a member. The government considers him the top official of the Iranian Army in charge of purchasing military ordnance in Europe and the United States.

His pocket address book, which was a key piece of evidence, revealed that Kashani, an aeronautical engineer and a colonel in Khomeini's army, was operating several networks of weapons buyers out of the Spanish capital; the buyers would make their purchases in the United Kingdom, Portugal, and the United States.

In the address book were written the names of most of his contacts—almost all of them people involved in the military—in several different countries, to whom he would send orders for all kinds of weaponry.

Although some of the names appear to be written in code, the Spanish police have been able to confirm that the Persian engineer, acting in concert with another military official from his country, met in 1986 with two U.S. military officials who have been linked to the "Irangate" scandal and who were trusted aides of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, the leading figure in the case.

The meeting took place in a suite at the Palace Hotel in Madrid, and Mehdi Kashani and his partner, who flew in from Tehran for the occasion, must not have reached an agreement because the U.S. officials returned to their country from the base at Torrejon de Ardoz, and the contacts were never renewed.

Kashani arrived in Spain in 1984, with the cover of a high-ranking executive of the Iranian national oil company. He opened up offices at 42 Calle General Peron in Madrid and set up the company Texconsultancy and Engineering as a front for his arms purchases.

The police tapped his phones, and, since that time, his office and his home, located in the Guayarmina neighborhood in La Moraleja, have been subject to surveillance off and on.

Another of his frequent "assistants" was Marcelino de Brito of Portugal, who was also arrested in Madrid. In the current case, De Brito appears to be the one who put the Iranian engineer in touch with the U.S. firm Tampa Helicopters, of Tampa, Florida. It was from this company that he bought the Klystron amplifiers, two of which were seized from Kashani on 9 March as he was exiting the Melia Castilla Hotel (not the Eurobuilding, as was erroneously reported by the police at first).

Finally, another person listed in his address book is Manuel Antonio Pires, also of Portugal, a peculiar man in his early fifties, who comes to Madrid every week and usually stays at the Hotel Atlanta.

Pires began doing business with Gibraltar when Franco closed the gate on the Rock in the 1960's. He hired two ships in Lisbon and began transporting essential foodstuffs to Gibraltar. Then he lined his pockets a little more in Angola during the decolonization, buying elephant tusks, rugs, paintings, and other valuable objects that the Portuguese returning to the mother country had to abandon at the Port of Luanda and reselling them in London.

Years later, he sold unenriched uranium from a mine located in northern Portugal to the Brazilian Government, which was intent on building an atomic bomb. And, finally, in the war pitting Iran against Iraq, he worked for Kashani in Madrid, buying parts for the TPS-43-D radar model that was installed at the airport at Tehran and other Iranian military bases.

[Box, p 8]

The Chilean Connection

Police investigators have learned that, in the late 1980's, Kashani made a trip to Tehran in the company of the Romanian-Argentine businessman Dino Seferian, now a naturalized Spaniard, to try to sell cluster bombs to the Iranian army.

These bombs, manufactured in Chile by businessman Carlos Cardoen, a confidant of then President Augusto Pinochet, are considered antipersonnel weapons. The gadget consists of a large metal canister that is dropped from an aircraft, opens up in the air, and can mine up to 50,000 square meters with more than 500 1-kg bomblets in a matter of seconds.

Dino Seferian, through his arms sales company CIC Iberica, which is recognized by the Spanish Defense Ministry and is located at 3 Calle Maria de Molina, had a license to sell this military device to countries in the Middle East. The names of his companies (Ferrimar Internacional, Cano Internacional, Narama, S.A., Global Communications, Bestware Internacional, S.A., CIC Iberica, and others) were listed in Mehdi Kashani's address book.

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